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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze optimal foreign direct investment of a firm which
operates in a duopolistic market. We characterize a technology spillover threshold
and show that for an intensity of spillovers below this threshold, there is a unique
locally asymptotic stable steady state with a positive capital stock in the developing
country. Furthermore, we characterize how optimal foreign investment patterns
and the investor’s value function depend on the level of technology transferred
and characterize the optimal level to be used for the foreign direct investment.
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1 Introduction
Based on UNCTAD statistic, worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) had increased
by a factor of more than 10 from 1983 to 2003. And this trend continues, from 2003 to
2013, the FDI inward and outward flows doubled again. While most FDI is still under-
taken in industrialized countries, such as the US, Great Britain, France, Italy and the
Netherlands, just to mention a few, more and more investment flows to the newly in-
dustrializing countries (NICs), especially Asian (mainly China and India) and Central
and Eastern Europe, which have recently joined the EU. Indeed, the UNCTAD statis-
tic presents that the emerging market takes more and more shares in the worldwide
FDI, from less than 1/5 in 1983 to almost half in 2013 at the aggregate of inward and
outward of FDI.
The motivation for firms to invest in NICs are primarily to get access to these mar-
kets and to benefit from in part drastically lower factor costs there. And cost reduction
motivation becomes the main factor influencing the location decisions of firms. For ex-
ample, Ireland provides a considerable tax incentive for foreign firms by offering a cor-
porate tax rate of 10 percent to all manufacturing firms producing in Ireland (see Go¨rg
and Greenaway, 2004). The reasons for governments to attract FDI seem to be clear.
Investment raises employment and growth and may also generate positive spillover
effects for local firms. The latter seems to be of particular importance for NICs, which
hope to get access to modern technologies in this way. While there is empirical ev-
idence that spillovers of FDI exist (see e.g. the survey by Lim, 2001). There are also
econometric studies, nevertheless, fail to find unambiguously positive effects, see for
example Aitken and Harrison (1999). One reason for this may be the lack of sufficiently
good microeconomic data on the firm level (cf. Go¨rg and Greenaway, 2004).
Nevertheless, great many empirical studies do find evidence for such spillover ef-
fects. Especially, Blomstrom et al. (2001) states ”foreign investors make available (di-
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rectly or indirectly) appropriable to host country business. Appropriable technology
should be viewed broadly as any tangible or intangible resource that can generate eco-
nomic rent for host country firms, · · · by improving total factor productivity.” Based
on this kind of argument and via using new firm-level data for German and Italian
manufacturing firms during the 1990s, Peri and Urban (2006) provide evidence of sig-
nificant technological spillover effects “which is robust to various ways of measuring
the total productivity of firms · · · .” More related literature can be seen in Dawid and
Zou (2014).
In this paper, we follow some FDI literature, such as, Das (1987), Wang and Blom-
strom (1992), Petit et al. (2000), Dawid et al. (2010), among others (for a survey of
theoretical models, see Cheng (1984) or Saggi (2002)), and assume that the change in
the host country’s productivity is formulated as an increasing function of the presence
of foreign capital stock. Here, multinational firm have to decide whether and, if so,
how much to invest in a developing economy. Firm invests in physical capital, but
investment in physical capital is associated with positive technology spillovers which
raise the stock of knowledge of their competitors, thus, negatively affecting its own
sales and reduces profits.
Differing from the above literature, we model the growth rate of technological
spillover, rather than the technological change itself, depends on the accumulated cap-
ital stock and the technology gap. Thus, the main result is that we frame a technolog-
ical spillover threshold. When the absorption rate of developing country is below this
threshold, there is less possibility for technological spillover and hence it is beneficial
to take advantage of developing country’s low marginal cost of production. Thus, this
kind of FDI leads to a long run steady state where there is positive capital stock in the
developing country. Furthermore, this technological spillover threshold exposes infor-
mation for high technique firms which kind of technology should take to the foreign
country.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the the-
oretical model. In section 3 we first analyze the long-run behavior of the investment
policy of the firm, formulate the technological spillover threshold and provide infor-
mation on which level of technology should take for FDI. Then, via numerical method,
we present the trajectory dynamics under different cases. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a dynamic two-country model where country H (‘home country’) is a
developed industrialized country whereas country F (‘foreign country’) is a newly in-
dustrializing country. We denote by Qi(t) the output of firm i at time t, i = H,F .
Firms produce using labor as the only variable production input. Production ca-
pacities of a firm in a country are determined by its capital stock there. Output per
input unit in the two countries is given by AH(t) and AF (t) with AH(t) > AF (t). If the
firm from country H produces in country F , productivity reads AHF (t) where initially
AF (0) < AHF (0) < AH(0). Since our focus is on the effects of technological spill-overs
generated by FDI on the evolution of the technology gap between the two countries,
we abstract from technological change in the developed country. The technology, AHF ,
which firm H takes to invest in country F, may change over time depending on the
situation in country F given AF (t) may change over time due to spill-over effects. In
both countries labor is supplied at wage rates wH and wF , where wH >> wF .
We assume that firms in country H can reduce their unit production costs if they
produce in the foreign country, i.e.,
wH
AH
>
wF
AHF
. (1)
In order to produce abroad, firm H has to invest to build up production capacities
in country F. We denote by I(t) ∈ R foreign investment of firm H and by KF (t) the
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capital stock of firm H in country F at time t. It should be noted that we also allow for
negative investment, and due to the spillover-effects described below disinvestment
might in principle be optimal for firm H. The capital accumulation equation is given
by
K˙F (t) = I(t)− δKF (t) (2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and I ∈ R which reads if I > 0 there is
positive investment, while I < 0, disinvestment is possible.
Foreign direct investments of firmH in country F generate technological spill-overs.
Following the classical literature Nelson and Phelps (1966) and more recent empirical
contribution, such as Peri and Urban (2006), we posit that the change in technology
level in the foreign country is determined by the absorption rate λ, the accumulated
past investment KF and the technological gap, AHF (t) − AF (t). Nonetheless, the em-
pirical contribution of Peri and Urban (2006) and our recent theoretical studies, Dawid
and Zou (2014), notice that the absorption depends also on the efforts and technologi-
cal level of country F . As Hymer (1960) and Blomstrom et al. (2001) already mention
that foreign direct investment does not only transfer physical capital, but also transfers
management and new technology via spillover effects. We call all, with exception of
physical capital, as technology and measure the effort of foreign country by its tech-
nological level. Thus, in the following we combine both the absorption rate and the
technology AF of firm F together and denote λAF (t) as absorption ability. Hence, the
law of motion of technology of firm F is governed by
A˙F (t) = G(λ,AF (t), KF (t), AHF (t)− AF (t)) = λAF (t)KF (t) · (AHF − AF (t)) (3)
with initial condition AF (0) ∈ (0, AH) given. A different interpretation of (3) can be
given by rewriting it as
A˙F (t)
AF
= λKF (t) · (AHF − AF (t)) .
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Thus, different from Dawid et al. (2010), we assume the technological growth rate of
country F due to FDI is determined by the accumulated capital stock and the technol-
ogy gap.
Except the investment of firm H , both firms at each point of time also choose their
output quantities based on Cournot competition, given that the output choices do not
have any intertemporal implications. And the marginal costs are cH = WHAH , cF (t) =
WF
AF (t)
, where for simplicity, we assume that foreign investment will not increase the
wage rate in the country F .
In the following, we take linear demand function and the inverse demand function
is given by
P (t) = P¯ − (QH +QF ) (4)
where P¯ is a positive constant reservation price. Then, the existence and uniqueness of
Cournot equilibrium for our duopolistic market with heterogenous marginal produc-
tion cost are demonstrated in detail by Dawid et al (2010). Furthermore, the equilib-
rium outputs and price in the duopolistic market are given as follows:
Q∗ = Q∗H +Q
∗
F , Q
∗
H(AF ) =
P − 2wH
AH
+ wF
AF
3
, Q∗F (AF ) =
P − 2wF
AF
+ wH
AH
3
,
P ∗ =
P + wH
AH
+ wF
AF
3
.
(5)
Therefore, firm H’s equilibrium profit is
Π∗H(KF , AF ) = Q
∗
H(AF )
(
P ∗(AF )− wH
AH
)
+KFAHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
= (Q∗H(AF ))
2 +KF
(
wH
AH
AHF − wF
)
.
(6)
In the following, we impose condition such that even the wage rate, wF , in coun-
try F is sufficiently low, there is still positive output produced by firm H– marginal
production cost of firm H is not too high.
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Assumption 1 P > 2 wh
AH
.
A first observation is the following:
Lemma 1 Profit function Π∗H is continuously differentiable with respect toAF andKF . More-
over,
∂Π∗H
∂AF
= −2Q
∗
H(AF )wF
3A2F
< 0
and
∂Π∗H
∂KF
= AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
> 0, iff
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
> 0.
Indeed, this Lemma demonstrates the conflict, from firm H’s point of view, of for-
eign direct investment which we introduced in the introduction: on the one hand, FDI
reduces firm H’s cost and hence increases its profit; but on the other hand, FDI with
technological spillover induces more competition and thus deduces profit of firm H .
In the following section we analyze the dynamic optimization problem of Firm H.
We consider how the outcomes change when the technological spillover depends on
AF , except the technological gap AHF − AF .
3 The dynamic optimization problem of Firm H
After having determined the optimal level of production, firm H faces the intertempo-
ral problem of choosing optimal investment strategy, I(t) ∈ R, to maximize its profit:
max
I
JH = max
I
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Π∗H(KF , AF )− (βI + γI2)
]
dt, (7)
subject to accumulation of capital (2), technological spillover (3) with KF (0) and AF (0)
given, and the state constraint
KF (t) ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
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where r > 0 is the time preference parameter. βI + γI2 are gross investment costs,
while I are net investment costs, with unit adjustment γ a positive constant and pur-
chasing cost β > 0 playing the role of Tobin’s q. The difference between gross and net
investment cost is due to purchasing and adjustment costs of investment.
3.1 The dynamics
In what follows, we shall characterize the inter-temporally optimal investment for firm
H. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle and standard Lagrangian method, a
canonical system of ordinary differential equations can be derived that has to be sat-
isfied by the optimal trajectories. However, since the optimized Hamiltonian of the
dynamic optimization problem of firm H is not concave with respect to the two state
variables, KF and AF , the Maximum principle provides only necessary but not suffi-
cient optimality conditions (see e.g. Dockner at al. (2000)). Nevertheless, Dawid et al.
(2010) demonstrate that the choice presented in the following proposition are optimal.
Proposition 1 For any state trajectory (KF (t), AF (t)) that corresponds to an optimal strategy
of firm H, there exist piecewise absolutely continuous co-states µK(t), µA(t), and a multiplier
η(t) ≥ 0, such that, the optimal investment is
I(t) =
µK(t)− β
2γ
, (8)
and the costate equations are
˙µK = (δ + r)µK − µAλAF (AHF − AF )− AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− η, (9)
µ˙A = rµA − µAλKF (AHF − 2AF )− ∂Π
∗
H(KF , AF )
∂AF
. (10)
Furthermore, the multiplier checks
ηK = 0, η ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
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and the transversality conditions lim
t→∞
e−rtµKKF = 0, lim
t→∞
e−rtµAAF = 0 are satisfied. In
addition, at any time τ where the trajectory hits the boundary K = 0, the co-state µK might
have a jump with limt→τ− µK(t) ≥ limt→τ+ µK(t).
In the following subsection, we characterize the potential steady states of the sys-
tem under optimal investment and analyze how the initial technology gap, (AHF−AF ),
and firm F’s technology, AF , determine which steady state is reached.
Rest points of the differential equations (2), (3), (9) and (10) give steady states for
our model. It is easy to see that there are two different steady states: (I) Catching-up
steady state with KF 6= 0 and (II) left-behind steady state with KF = 0.
3.2 Steady states
Let us first study the steady state withKF 6= 0. Setting A˙F = 0, K˙F = 0, µ˙K = 0, µ˙A = 0,
we obtain the other variables of this steady state as
η̂ = 0,
ÂF = AHF ,
µ̂K =
AHF
δ + r
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
,
Î = δK̂F =
µ̂K − β
2γ
,
µ̂A = − 1
r + λK̂FAHF/2
∂Π∗H(K̂F , ÂF )
∂AF
.
(11)
To guarantee nonnegative investment and capital stock at the steady state, if and
only if µ̂K > β, which is equivalent to the following condition:
Assumption 2
β <
AHF
r + δ
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
.
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The economic meaning of this assumption is straightforward by recalling that the
right hand side reads the gain from unit capital invested in country F. Thus, with pos-
itive long-run investment and capital stock in the foreign country, the gain should be
larger than the purchasing price.
As concerns existence and stability of catching-up steady state, it turns out that the
absorption rate plays a crucial role in that respect. Define
λ = − 4r
A2HF
(
AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− β(r + δ)
)
/
∂Π∗H(0, AHF/2)
∂AF
(12)
as the threshold for the spillover intensity. It is easy to check that this threshold, λ,
increases with the difference of marginal costs,
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
, and the given FDI tech-
nology, AHF .
The next proposition shows that as long as the intensity is below this level, catching-
up steady state is the unique long-run steady state.
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, 2 and FDI technology AHF ∈ (AF (0), AH) ⊂ (0, AH),
there exists a λ > 0, which is given by (12), such that, for every λ < λ, steady state (11) is
the unique steady state. Furthermore, this steady state is locally asymptotic stable in its state
space.
Proof: See appendix.
The Proposition 2 states that there exists a situation such that it can be optimal for
the home country firm to build up a capital stock in the developing country, K̂F > 0, in
the long-run. However, besides this outcome, it is also possible that the firm does not
invest in the developing country in the long-run, so that K̂F = 0 holds. Whether there
exist two steady states or only one catching-up steady state depends on the parameter
λ, which determines how fast the developing country absorbs the new technology.
So, for λ > λ both steady states may be feasible, while for λ < λ only steady state
with K̂F > 0 exists. From an economic point of view, the latter case means that the firm
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will always maintain a capital stock in the developing country and produce there if the
catching-up speed of the developing country is small. Recalling that investment in
the developing country increases the level of technology of the firms there and, thus,
the competitiveness of these firms, this outcome is plausible. If this process is slow,
the negative effect of investing in the foreign country, i.e. the spillovers, only takes
place gradually. Therefore, for small values of λ it is always optimal to invest in the
developing country in the long-run. It should also be noted that the value of λ does
not affect the steady state values of investment and capital in the developing country
in steady state.
Before closing this section, we notice that the threshold condition (12) is given in
relative term of marginal production cost and FDI technology AHF . Thus, from a dif-
ferent point of view, the threshold condition imposes very important information for
FDI technology AHF . To make this point clear, we first rewrite condition (12) as the
following
λAF (AHF − AF ) |AF=AHF /2= −r
(
AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− β(r + δ)
)
/
∂Π∗H(0, AHF/2)
∂AF
,
(13)
where the left hand side states firm F’s benchmark absorption ability, λAF , considering
the technology gap (AHF − AF ) and evaluated at AF = AHF/2, which is the optimal
level of Firm F’s technological change, i.e., maximum of the right hand side of equation
(3). The right hand side of (13) is the unit gain-loss-ratio, where the gain comes from
cost reduction from FDI, due to Assumption 2, and the loss comes from the technolog-
ical spillover to firm F; and the ratio is discounted by time preference r.
Thus, condition λ < λ reads that, from the point of view of firm H, the optimal
spillover , taking into account the technological gap and foreign firm’s absorption abil-
ity, should not be larger than firm H’s gain-loss-ratio of taking this FDI. Put this condi-
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tion differently, λ < λ condition is equivalent to
λ < − 4r
A2HF
(
AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− β(r + δ)
)
/
∂Π∗H(0, AHF/2)
∂AF
,
Changing the notation, it yields
AHF < − 4r
λAHF
(
AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− β(r + δ)
)
/
∂Π∗H(0, AHF/2)
∂AF
,
which implicitly states the optimal FDI technology, that is, the FDI technology should
be no more than the unit gain-loss-ratio by taking into account the discounting rate
and firm F’s absorption ability, λAF , and all evaluated at the maximum growth rate of
spillover, here, AF = AHF/2.
More precisely, given firm F’s absorption rate λ, rewriting the above inequality in
term of AHF yields that AHF has to satisfy the following second order polynomial in-
equality condition:
9r
wH
AH
A2HF −
[
9r(wF + β(r + δ)) + 2λwF
(
P − 2wH
AH
)]
AHF − 4λw2F > 0, (14)
which always has two roots with one negative and one positive. Denote the positive
root as AmHF . Thus, the optimal choice of FDI technology, from the above inequality,
must satisfies: AHF > AmHF .
We conclude this finding in the following:
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold, let λ > 0 be given constant firm F’s absorp-
tion rate, then the sufficient condition for keeping positive FDI is that FDI technology checks
max{AF (0), AmHF} < AHF ≤ AH ,
where AmHF is the positive root of (14).
Though this result does not offer optimal FDI technology, it indeed implies the
lower bound of FDI technology. The left hand side inequality reads that too low FDI
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technology (such as, AHF < AmHF ) is not advance enough to compensate the cost in-
duced by FDI technology spillover. The last inequality is a surprising results, which
states that the FDI technology could be the most advanced one of firm H. The rea-
son for this is twofold: on the one hand, the catching-up process of firm F, via equa-
tion (3), reaches its maximum level at AF = AHF2 and decreases its catching-up speed
after that1. In other words, the closer the technology of firm F to the level of AHF ,
the harder is it to catch up2. Keeping this in mind, then on the other hand, the gain
from higher FDI technology is much higher than with lower one, which is given by(
AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− β(r + δ)
)
/
∂Π∗H(0,AHF /2)
∂AF
.
Therefore, combining these two sides together, for given absorption rate of the for-
eign country, the above proposition indeed provides information of FDI technology,
which is new in literature.
We close this subsection by noticing that the second steady state implies that the
home country firm H does not produce in the developing country in the long-run, i.e.
KF = 0 holds. This implies that investment in steady state equals zero, I = 0, and
µK = β. Similar arguments as Dawid et al. (2010), we can finish the rest study of this
steady state, which we do not repeat here.
3.3 Dynamics and the Effect of AHF on the Value Function
Having discussed sufficient conditions under which the only steady state under op-
timal behavior of firm H induces full catch-up of the firm F to the technology level
transferred by H , we now return to the question which level of technology should be
transferred by firm H . To formulate this question more precisely, we will explore now
how the choice of AHF affects the value function of firm H for a given initial techno-
1That does not mean the catching-up stop, actually, A˙F ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 0.
2That also confirms a similar finding of Dawid and Zou (2014) with endogenous effort of absorption
under a differential game setting.
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logical level AF (0) of firm F .
In order to address this question we need to calculate the value function of firm
H for different values of AHF in order to compare them. The dynamic optimization
problem of the firm does not have any special structure that would allow to derive a
closed form analytical expression for the value function. Therefore, we rely on numer-
ical methods to calculate the value function of the problem. In particular, we employ
a collocation method based on a Chebychew polynomial approximation of the value
function (see Dawid and Zou (2014) or Vedenov and Miranda (2001) for details about
this method.). The standard parameter setting for the following analysis is given in
Table 1.
AH = 4 AF (0) = 1.7 r = 0.03
β = 0 γ = 500 δ = 0.06
P¯ = 5 wH = 4 wF = 1
Table 1: Standard parameter setting
It should be noted that under this parameter setting the unit costs of production
in the own country (without any spillovers) are lower for firm F than for firm H (i.e.
wF/AF (0) < wH/AH). This implies that firm H can profit from transferring production
to country F with a level of technology that is already used in that country (i.e. AHF =
AF (0)). In such a case firm H can reduce own production costs without inducing any
increase of the productivity of its competitor in country F . As we will show below that
this does however not necessarily imply that foreign investment is profitable for firm
H for any value of AHF ∈ [AF (0), AH ].
In Figure 1 we show the value function V (0, AF (0)) of firm H (i.e. the maximal dis-
counted profit stream for firm H starting from no initial capital in country F and an
13
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Figure 1: The value function V (0, 1.7) of firm H for AHF ∈ [1.7, 2.6] under the standard
parameter setting.
initial technology level AF (0) for firm F ) if the productivity of transferred technology
varies in an interval above AF (0). The blue horizontal line in the figure indicates the
discounted profit for firm H if it does not engage in any FDI. It can be clearly seen that
for the standard parameter setting it is profitable for the firm to move part of its pro-
duction to country F regardless of the choice of AHF . Furthermore, the figure indicates
that the relationship the level of the transferred technology and the value function of
firm H is not monotonous. For large values of AHF there is a positive relationship,
implying that transferring the best available technology to firm H is optimal if the
productivity in country F induced by such a transfer is close to AH . However, in the
lower part of the considered range for AHF the relationship is negative, which implies
that, if for some reason firm H cannot generate a productivity in country F that is sub-
stantially larger than the productivity of the local firm (in our parameter setting the
threshold is approximately AHF = 2.0), then it is optimal for firm H to use the same
technology in country F that is already used by firm F , thereby avoiding any spillovers
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to the local firm.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Dynamics of instantaneous profits (= instantaneous utilities) (a) and invest-
ments (b) of firm H under AHF = 1.7 (red line), AHF = 2.0 (green line) and AHF = 2.6
(blue line). The back line in panel (a) indicates instantaneous profits of firm H if it
produces only in country H .
To gain a better understanding of the reasons for the non-monotonicity of the value
function of firm H we consider in Figure 2 the dynamics of instantaneous profits, that
is, instantaneous utilities, and optimal investments of firm H for three different values
of AHF . In panel (a) we also depict as a reference point the (constant) profit of firm H
if it does not engage in any foreign investment (black line). The blue trajectories cor-
respond to the case where firm H transfers an advanced technology to country F such
that the productivity of firmH in country F is much larger than the productivity of the
local firm F . It can be clearly seen in panel (a) that initially instantaneous payoffs of
firm H are lower compared to a scenario where it would not engage in FDI. The reason
clearly is that the firm has to cover substantial investment costs, whereas initially the
capital stock in country F is so small that no large cost reductions can be achieved.
In the long run, however the cost savings for firm H dominate the investment costs
and the negative effect on prices induced by the catching-up of firm F . The long run
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profits of firm H under the transfer of this high technology are the largest among the
four considered scenarios, which explains why the value function for firm H is largest
for high values of AHF .
A similar picture emerges if we consider the trajectories for AHF = 2.0 with the
difference that investment intensity is much smaller that for AHF = 2.6. Initially this
saves costs for firmH , and therefore initial profits are larger than underAHF = 2.6, but
in the long run, the cost saving effect is smaller inducing much smaller long run profits.
If the level of technology transferred is further reduced toAHF = 1.7, which means that
the same technology is used by firm H than by firm F , the qualitative implications of
a decrease in AHF change. First, for a very short initial period the investment under
AHF = 1.7 is actually larger than under AHF = 2.0. The reason for this observation
is that for AHF = 1.7 no spillovers are generated, which means that firm H faces no
negative externalities of its investment. This increases the incentives to invest. Also
in the long run the profits under AHF = 1.7 are smaller than under AHF = 2.0. Like
discussed above this is due to the fact that the larger cost-savings gained in the long-
run under AHF = 2.0 outweigh the (negative) long-run price effects induced by the
spillovers to firm F . However, in an medium-run time window (approx. t = 5 to
t = 50) the profits of firm H under AHF = 1.7 are substantially larger than under
AHF = 2.0. In this time window the relatively small capital stock in country F prevents
large differences in the cost savings for firm H under the two scenarios, and therefore
the price effect induced by the spillovers generated underAHF = 2.0 (and absent under
AHF = 1.7) dominates. Figure 1 shows that the profit difference in this intermediate
time window is sufficiently large to make the discounted profit stream of firm H larger
under AHF = 1.7.
For our standard parameter setting the FDI is profitable for firm H regardless of
the level of technology that is transferred, but in scenarios with larger investment costs
choosing the right value of AHF can be essential to make FDI profitable. To illustrate
16
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Figure 3: The value function V (0, 1.7) of firm H for AHF ∈ [1.7, 2.6] and β = 3.5.
this we show in Figure 3 the value function of firm H for AF (0) = 1.7, KF (0) = 0 and a
positive price of foreign capital of β = 3.5. As expected, increasing the investment cost
parameter β shifts the value function downwards. The U-shape of the function stays
unchanged, and, as becomes clear from Figure 3, there is a range of value of AHF for
which investment in country F is not profitable for firmH . For these values the sum of
the investment costs and the externalities through spillovers outweigh the cost savings
that can be optimally gained and it is therefore optimal for firm H to refrain from any
investments. Interestingly, there is however an interval of AHF value both above and
below this range such that FDI is profitable.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic model of the firm from a developed coun-
try which operates in an duopolistic market. The firm has an incentive to invest and
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produce in a developing country to reduce production cost, but due to spillover, this
investment raises the technology level of its competitors in the developing economy.
Following literature on absorptive capacity we assume that the intensity of the
spillovers does not only depend on the size of the foreign capital stock of the high-
tech firm and the size of the technological gap, but also on the accumulated efforts to
absorb the spillovers. Here, we measure these kind of efforts by the technology level
in low-tech country.
We could demonstrate that there exists a unique steady state with a positive cap-
ital stock in the developing economy if the speed of technology transfer is below a
certain threshold, which is determined by the optimal growth rate of spillover of tech-
nology. This makes sense from an economic point of view. If the catching-up process
is relatively slow, the firm can be assured that the competitiveness of the firms in the
developing country rises only slowly, so that it is optimal to build up a capital stock in
the developing country in the long-run.
As a by-product, the threshold of absorption rate implicitly imposes conditions un-
der which the high technology firm H should engage in FDI.
Based on numerical calculations we have then shown that the value function of
firm H depends in a non-monotonic way on the level of transferred technology AHF .
In particular, we have demonstrated that using the technology that is already estab-
lished in the foreign country is more profitable for firm H than transferring a better
technology as long as the gap between the established and the transferred technology
is not too large.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The Hamiltonian for the investment problem of firm H is given by
H(KF , AF , µK , µA, ν) = Π∗H(KF , AF )− βI − γI2 + µK(I − δKF )
+µAλAFK(AHF − AF )
and, taking into account the state-constraint, we obtain the Lagrangian
L(KF , AF , µK , µA, ν) = Π∗H(KF , AF )− βI − γI2 + µK(I − δKF )
+µAλAFK(AHF − AF ) + ηK.
By Pontryagin’s maximum principle, for every optimal investment path there must
exist piecewise absolutely continuous co-states µi(t) and a piecewise continuous mul-
tiplier η(t) ≥ 0, such that, investment at each time t maximizes L, the co-states satisfy
the equations
µ˙1 = ρµ1 − ∂L
∂KF
,
µ˙2 = ρµ2 − ∂L
∂AF
,
for the multiplier ηK = 0, ∀t ≥ 0, and the transversality conditions are satisfied. Fur-
thermore, for each time τi of discontinuity of µK , there exists an η(τi) ≥ 0 with
lim
t→τi+
µK(t) = lim
t→τi−
µK(t) + ν(τi)
Because in our problem no movement of the state on the K = 0 line is possible,
the problem is time autonomous and has an infinite time horizon, it is obvious that an
optimal trajectory can never leave the boundary once it has hit it. Therefore, the only
possible discontinuity of µK may occur at the time when the optimal trajectory hits the
K = 0 line. Direct calculation yields the Proposition.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is finished by several steps. In Step one, we first show the existence of this
steady state, then in Step two, we study the stability of this steady state and finally, we
demonstrate the existence of threshold λ.
Step 1. Existence
Suppose that KF 6= 0 holds. Setting A˙F = 0, K˙F = 0, µ˙1 = 0, µ˙2 = 0, we obtain the
other variables of this steady state as
η̂ = 0,
ÂF = AHF ,
µ̂K =
AHF
δ + r
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
,
Î = δK̂F =
µ̂K − β
2γ
,
µ̂A = − 1
r + λK̂FAHF/2
∂Π∗H(K̂F , ÂF )
∂AF
.
The same arguments as in Dawid et al. (2010), we can show that this fixed point of
the canonical system is indeed a steady-state of the optimal policy of firm H.
Step 2. Stability
To determine stability of this steady state, we consider the Jacobian matrix at the
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steady state which is given by
JI =

−δ 0 1
2γ
0
λÂF (AHF − ÂF ) λK̂F (AHF − 2ÂF ) 0 0
0 λµ̂A(AHF − 2ÂF ) δ + r −λÂF (AHF − ÂF )
−λµ̂A(AHF − 2ÂF ) 2λµ̂AK̂F − ∂
2Π∗H(K̂F ,ÂF )
∂A2F
0 r − λK̂F (AHF − 2ÂF )

=

−δ 0 1
2γ
0
0 −λK̂FAHF/2 0 0
0 λµ̂AAHF/2 δ + r 0
λµ̂AAHF/2 2λµ̂AK̂F − ∂
2Π∗H(K̂F ,AHF )
∂A2F
0 r + λK̂FAHF/2

.
It is easy to show that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given by
e1 = −δ < 0, e2 = δ + r > 0, e3 = −λ
2
AHF K̂F < 0, e4 = r +
λ
2
AHF K̂F > 0.
Since there are two negative and two positive eigenvalues, the fixed-point is a saddle
point of the canonical system, and, therefore, the steady state is locally asymptotically
stable in its state space.
Step 3. Existence of λ
We start by considering the necessary conditions that have to be satisfied at a steady-
state with K̂F = 0. In any such steady state, Î = 0 must hold which implies µ̂K = β.
Thus, µ˙K = 0 yields
µ̂A =
1
λAF (AHF − AF )
(
(r + δ)β − AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− η̂
)
.
Since η̂ ≥ 0, this is equivalent to
µ̂A ≤ q1(AF ) := − r + δ
λAF (AHF − AF )
(
AHF
r + δ
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
− β
)
.
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Furthermore, µ˙2 = 0 yields
µ̂A = q2(AF ) :=
1
r
∂pi∗1(0, AF )
∂AF
.
This implies that a steady-state with K̂F = 0 can only exist for values of AF where
q1(AF ) ≥ q2(AF ).
It is easy to prove that q1(AF ) is negative and concave in term of AF and checks
lim
AF→0
q1(AF ) = lim
AF→AHF
q1(AF ) = −∞, while q2 is bounded from below on (AF (0), AHF ] ⊂
(0, AH ]. Therefore, for values of AF sufficiently close to AHF , we have q1(AF ) < q2(AF )
and no steady state with K̂F = 0 can exist. Thus, q1(AF ) ≥ q2(AF ) if and only if at
the maximum AmF = argmax q1(AF ), there is q1(A
m
F ) ≥ q2(AmF ). It is easy to check that
AmF = AHF/2.
Define λ as in the proposition, we finish the proof.
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